Travel Update

To any and all readers out there, I apologize for the lack of frequency of posts in this space. I have been with and without my laptop for the better part of two weeks (coffee and laptops do not mix) and recently had to drop it off again at the computer shop due to a persistent wifi issue, which has finally been resolved. I am also in the middle of some travel, having gone to Washington, D.C., Sunday, and am leaving for Amman, Jordan (traveling through Istanbul) in eight hours.

Please, keep looking for more posts here. On my plane flight, I do plan to do some writing in this space, as much as is possible. My on-the-ground insights from Jordan will appear here over the next eight weeks or so. I will have more limited internet connectivity, and a serious general issue of tons and tons of Arabic coursework that will severely limit blogging time. But I should be able to post away fairly frequently. Until then, salaam.

On the Palestinians

I am by no means a "pro-Israel" person. I am, however, a pro-reality person, and the reality is Israel isn't going away. No matter how hard Hamas, Hizballah, Iran, or whatever other threat tries, Israel will not disappear. They could send the region into catastrophic warfare, sure, but so could a lot of other states. Let's all remember a few really important facts. One: Israel has a better-trained army, if not a larger one, than all of its neighbors with the possible exception of Turkey. Two: Israel has nuclear weapons. They may avoid the question, and that's neither here nor there. But they do, and none of their neighbors possess them. Three: Israel has already beaten its neighbors three major times, and several minor times, in wars. Easily. Moreover, Israel has the United States at its back, and if attacked, likely most of the West. Israel isn't going away, and at some point, we all do need to accept that.

Acceptance of that fact then leads a supporter of the Palestinian people's aspiration for statehood — myself — to demand the best possible borders and state for Palestinians. The way I look at it, there are many millions of Palestinians throughout the world. There are Palestinians who carry a passport from another country, who are citizens of France, the UK, the US, Jordan and others. Of the Palestinians worldwide, these probably have it the "best off," though it still isn't idea. Some, like Randa Jarrar, can't visit their homeland due to a Palestinian ID card. I have many friends in Jordan in this predicament, and it is nothing short of unjust; forbidding Palestinians from visiting family and the third-holiest site in Islam, not to mention the site of Christ's crucifixion for Palestinian Christians, is inherently wrong, security concerns be damned.

Another group is the Palestinian refugees, stateless, in Lebanon, Syria (I hope they've all left, but I'm not sure on this point), Jordan and a few in Egypt. No state. No passport. No citizenship. Stripped of nationality, and frankly, dignity.

Another are those in East Jerusalem, denied Israeli citizenship despite its annexation of the city, denied Palestinian citizenship because, well, there is no such thing. I met a peace activist from East Jerusalem and stayed in a guest house run by him when I visited. He has no passport, yet somehow has been to most of the United States. But he is unique, and his is a tragic situation, stripped again of citizenship and statehood.

Palestinians in the West Bank at least have the Palestinian Authority, but that doesn't help much: It isn't a state. Palestinians in Gaza only just now have access out through the Rafah crossing. Palestinians in Israel get to vote for Arab parties consistently outside of Israeli governments and are discriminated against. It's a no-win situation.

All this leads one to conclude that a state is better than no state. Palestinians with a passport are better off than Palestinians without one. Thus, supporters of Palestine should fight for the best state possible. The two-state solution is not dead until people give up. The alternative — long-term apartheid under a one-state solution — is unacceptable, as is the status quo.

I want to touch on the Egypt-Israel peace treaty (and by extension, the Jordan-Israel peace treaty) in another post, as for some bizarre reason, people are uncertain of its future.

Thoughts on Israel's Coalition Government

Taking a break from Egypt for a day, Aaron David Miller's Foreign Policy piece caught my eye earlier today. Miller argues, rightly in my view, that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu isn't the man to lead Israel through its transition period, establish peace with its neighbors, a Palestinian state and somehow find a way out of the Iranian crisis. Miller:

Israel has its own problems, and a leadership crisis, too. It is undergoing a political transition from a generation of founders who -- whatever their imperfections -- fashioned a remarkable country against extraordinarily grim odds. The era of David Ben Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ariel Sharon has given way to a younger generation of leaders who seem to lack the judgment, authenticity, and legitimacy of their predecessors.

That's about right. Ben Gurion had a ton of credibility. Begin, for some reason, had credibility when he became prime minister (he started out as a separatist), and only gained more after the Camp David Accords. Rabin had credibility, and was assassinated. Peres is still beloved. Sharon was the only Israeli politician with the clout to a) form a successful new political party, Kadima and b) unilaterally withdraw from Gaza. Sharon was next in a long line of Likud party members who came to accept the reality of a much-needed peace. He never got there, but there you have it.

Netanyahu is different. He is cold, calculating and risk-averse. He has shown a tremendous distrust in Arab leaders, particularly Abu Mazen (he's somewhat more comfortable with Salem Fayyad). He rejected Oslo outright, but then came to accept it and cede territory to the fledgling Palestinian Authority. He has been hawkish on Iran, but not nearly as much as Ehud Barak, his defense minister.

Some have argued that the new government, a coalition of Kadima under Shaul Mofaz and Likud under Netanyahu, with the religious party Shas and far-rightist Avigdor Lieberman thrown in for good measure, will pursue peace with the Palestinians. They're not entirely wrong. Peace is certainly more likely now than a month ago. But that's like the difference between finding a needle in a haystack and finding fifty needles in a haystack. It's not that much more likely.

The reason? Kadima is playing on Netanyahu's terms. While they balance the coalition more, they have no real authority or ministerial positions, aside from Mofaz. Kadima was on the brink of elections that would have decimated it and only thrown more power to Likud and Yisrael Beitnu. Neither Labor nor Meretz, nor any of the other new parties, would have been able to take advantage of Kadima's fall. Mofaz saved the party, but he didn't really ensure a peace deal.

Now, there have been encouraging signs. Netanyahu and Abbas have exchanged letters. Peter Beinart makes the claim that the Israelis and Palestinians have been negotiating all along and we haven't heard about it. And Netanyahu could use this moment, with a unity government behind him, to push for a long-term peace deal. There's just no reason to believe he, or the coalition government, has any desire to do so.

Instability, Continued Protests in Egypt: The Rise of Ahmed Shafiq

Today, the official election results were released by the Presidential Election Commission (Bassem Sabry swears there's no "Supreme" in front of it, but the hashtag on Twitter is #SPEC). Egypt has been in a semi-controlled state of turmoil since election results first trickled out on Thursday evening. Apparently, this was the final stimulus to send Egypt back to protests.

An update on the news: Presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq's campaign headquarters in Cairo has been set on fire. Protesters have filled Tahrir Square and Alexandria, tearing apart flyers in the campaign offices, and Shafiq's villa has been graffitied. Aboul Fotouh, Sabahi, Khaled Ali and Amr Moussa have disavowed any cooperation with Mohammed Morsi's campaign. Egypt is divided.

This plays right into the hands of Ahmed Shafiq. If Morsi, Aboul Fotouh, Sabahi, Ali and Moussa are united in any respect, it is in their collective desire to never see Shafiq become president. Thus far, even that desire has not led to any sort of unity among themselves or their supporters. Instead, calls range from boycott to a coup to protests.

Sabahi has appeared on television condemning the burning of Shafiq's headquarters and supporting non-violent protest. But Egyptians are inflamed with anger right now at perceptions of an unjust election. Rumors abound of 900,000 police conscripts voting for Ahmed Shafiq and other election irregularities, but as of now, they're just rumors.

All of this plays right into the hands of Ahmed Shafiq. If I didn't know better, I'd say Shafiq staged all of this today. The burning down of the headquarters, protests when Egypt has lost its appetite for continued protest, divisiveness and anger; Shafiq is the "law-and-order" candidate. This is what he promises to control, by whatever means necessary. That prospect is extremely troubling, but if protesters can't be non-violent, Shafiq could actually win in the runoff.

There's still a month before Egyptians go to the polls again. But these early indicators are troubling. Hopefully, the chaos of today causes supporters of rival candidates and campaigns to rethink calls for unity, and Egypt can stop the rise of Ahmed Shafiq.

The Worst Possible Result, Part 2

After taking a day to compose myself, I've come to a couple conclusions, part of which are mostly in line with Bassem Sabry's optimistic take on the election results. It should be noted, though, that this requires a certain series of events to follow a certain timeline, which I'll detail below. In short, though, this is what we can draw from the results:

1. This is still the worst possible scenario, and in some ways it has only gotten worse since yesterday. I know yesterday I speculated that some people, particularly the Brothers and Salafists, would have found a Moussa-Shafiq matchup even worse. To be sure, that result would have inspired rioting and send tremendous disunity throughout Egypt. But Moussa likely would have won and not entirely marginalized the Islamist groups, particularly the FJP in parliament. This scenario is worse. Disunity? Check. More on that later. Rioting? Almost, and leftists have shown tremendous restraint thus far. But these are the most polarizing candidates, as pointed out by the Arabist. They are the candidates which significant segments of the population trust the least. Morsi and the Brotherhood are mistrusted (if not even deeper feelings) by the entire secular and liberal groups, and by many Salafist leaders. Shafiq is hated by everyone not part of the former NDP, and perhaps Coptic Christians. Choosing between two different nightmares is not optimal for Egyptians, and no candidate still in the race can unite Egypt. What's interesting is that each of the other three had the potential to do so.
2. Ahmed Shafiq cannot win, and must not. We ought to discount Ahmed Shafiq's potential to unify Egypt out of hand. But for a moment, let's consider reasons to vote against Shafiq, if not for the Ikhwan. Shafiq held a press conference today, a comprehensive summary of which can be found via Rawya Rageh. In it, while on the one hand he promised to reach out to all, saying he was open to deals and called for everyone to join hands. Yet when he was accused of being part of the old regime, he snapped, "grow up, move on." He ignored all questions about his role in the Camel Battle and in firing on protesters. Shafiq can never unite Egypt. We need look no farther than his own words and actions.
3. Mohammed Morsi is not the optimal candidate to unite Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is known historically for moderation. Hassan al-Banna initially forbade the Brothers from engaging in politics, then contested elections. Then, the Brothers once again stayed out of politics as they were repressed by Nasser and Mubarak. Those imprisoned, including Essam el-Erian, generally moderated on their way out. The Brothers have turned from the path of Sayyid Qutb and violent overthrow, for which we can all be thankful. But there is still a conservative/moderate divide within the Ikhwan, seen prominently in Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh's departure, the resignation of several members after the nomination of Khairat el-Shater, and the conservative remarks (submitting legislation to a shura council of religious scholars, for instance) made by Morsi. Unlike the big tent campaign of Aboul Fotouh, Morsi can only lay claim to Brotherhood support. Unlike the amazing rise of Hamdeen Sabahi, Morsi and the Brothers were slow to support the revolution. Unlike the outside cautious support of Amr Moussa and his consistent espousal of the revolution's ideals, however sincere, Morsi has little experience in government and alienates Egyptians more than Egyptians tolerate him.
4. There is one possible positive outcome, which can come a couple ways, but has the same ending. Morsi can unite Egypt through really only one way, which is somehow building his campaign into a nationwide coalition against Shafiq. There's reason to trust Morsi on this: Farah Saafan followed his presser Saturday, in which he made many open overtures to Copts and other groups. Certain revolutionaries including Ayman Nour have offered five points of concession to both Shafiq and Morsi. Morsi himself has made personal overtures to Moussa, Aboul Fotouh and Sabahi, each of whom (unwisely, in my opinion) rejected an offer to meet to form a coalition. Still, Egyptians have a month, and few want a return to the Mubarak era.
5. Egyptians are understandably upset over the results, and are choosing discord to defend essential values over unity and compromise. This is understandable. Egyptians were devoted to their respective candidates, particularly the supporters of Hamdeen Sabahi. Nobody, least of all the secular left, wants to ally with the MB. But in the end, they may have to. Boycotting the runoff is not a solution; it will result in the shutting out of important and valuable forces from political power. Including Sabahi, Aboul Fotouh and Moussa as important positions in the potential new government under Morsi, perhaps even one as prime minister, along with ministerial positions for women and Copts, would at least give unity a shot, however unrealistic. Sabahi's supporters were fiery in support of their candidate today, but unless SPEC and SCAF nullify the votes of police officers and military personnel (a rumor, but nonetheless one that might just be true), he won't face Morsi. As hard as it may be, democracy requires choosing the lesser of two evils. Working within the new system is the best way to change it.

As Egyptians move forward with Morsi vs. Shafiq, remembering that the path forward to a united Egypt is on the edge of a knife is not just wise. It's essential.

The Worst Possible Result, Part 1

Egypt's first round of presidential elections is over, and the result is, in my opinion, the worst possible matchup of contenders. Tomorrow, I'll get into the results a bit more and what they might mean for Egypt (I'm also waiting on a rumored meeting between Hamdeen Sabahi, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Mohammed Morsi to take place Saturday). For coverage in the interim, visit Al-Ahram Online and Egypt Independent, as well as The Arabist and Bassem Sabry's Twitters.

In the meantime, I want to run through the runoff matchups that didn't happen, and what they would have meant, what choice they would have offered and what Egyptians might have thought. I offer these in no particular order, as my own ranking of "best-to-worst" is skewed in part by my support of Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and in part because I'm not Egyptian.

Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh vs. Hamdeen Sabahi: This extremely unlikely runoff scenario offers an interesting choice. It would have meant, contrary to what actually happened, the Muslim Brotherhood's campaign apparatus was a) unable to keep its youth in line and b) unable to turn out its members in sufficient numbers. Moreover, it would probably have reflected higher turnout from the revolutionary youth (benefitting Sabahi) and better organization from Salafists (benefitting Aboul Fotouh). None of that happened. Sabahi nearly made the real runoff, though, for reasons which are still somewhat inexplicable. Prediction: Aboul Fotouh, 65-35.

Hamdeen Sabahi vs. Ahmed Shafiq: This would never have happened, as the felool candidates (Amr Moussa and Ahmed Shafiq) split the old NDP vote (to some extent). What it would have meant in terms of turnout is somewhat unclear. The Islamists failing to get a single candidate in the top two would represent an astonishing failure on the part of two campaigns and a longstanding power apparatus. It would have reflected deep disgust on the part of the former FJP voters. And it would mean the Egyptian people swung 180 degrees from their FJP and Nour support to elect a horrible anti-revolution candidate and the leftist candidate most identifiable with the revolutionary youth. Prediction: Sabahi, 80-20.

Mohammed Morsi vs. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh: This was the showdown many may have hoped for. The MB would have successfully replicated its support in the parliamentary elections. The Salafists, too, would have held a reasonably disciplined line, and liberals and moderates would have voted in fair-to-middling numbers for Aboul Fotouh. But for some reason, the Salafists ended up supporting Morsi or Sabahi in Alexandria. This result also might have alienated the revolutionary youth. Prediction: Aboul Fotouh, 60-40.

Ahmed Shafiq vs. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh: Another matchup that could have happened, but didn't, because of the strength of the MB's campaign apparatus. This would have offered Egyptians a choice between unity and division, between a return to Mubarak and an inclusive way forward. The MB would have been incensed, of course, but there was no way Shafiq could have ever received their support. Prediction: Aboul Fotouh, 80-20.

Amr Moussa vs. Hamdeen Sabahi: In the case of the revolution versus the sorta-kinda felool, Egypt would have turned its back entirely on the Islamists. Salafist support for Aboul Fotouh would never have materialized, and the MB would simply have stayed home. The revolutionary youth would have been excited by the prospect of Sabahi's victory, and most of Egypt would have calmly settled on Amr Moussa. The question is, would anyone have voted for him? Moussa ran on an "everyone's second choice" strategy, which failed to turn out voters. Prediction: Sabahi, 55-45.

Mohammed Morsi vs. Amr Moussa: So many people had predicted this matchup, along with Aboul Fotouh and Morsi. It would represent the clash of secularism and Islamism, and the disorganization of the Salafist movement. Well, secularism and Islamism clashed, all right. But in a wholly different fashion. Shafiq is a different type of felool  — at least Moussa endorsed and talked about the revolution. In the end, I think Moussa's second choice strategy would have worked here. Prediction: Moussa, 60-40.

Ahmed Shafiq vs. Amr Moussa: Some people would argue this is the real nightmare scenario, where the Islamists not only failed to get a candidate in the second round, but the revolutionary youth failed to get either Khaled Ali or Hamdeen Sabahi in. There would be no candidate of the revolution. There would only be Hosni Mubarak and a blend of Mubarak and the revolution. Islamists would be shut out. But still, this matchup is less polarizing, and the winner would have been clear. Prediction: Moussa, 70-30.

Mohammed Morsi vs. Hamdeen Sabahi: This almost happened, and we know why. Sabahi's campaign surged late, driven by liberals wary of Aboul Fotouh's endorsement by the Salafists and secularists disengaged with the Moussa campaign. Salafist support crumbled entirely in Alexandria, which Sabahi won handedly. If Shafiq had collapsed in Giza and Cairo as much as he did in Alexandria, and done slightly poorer in the Nile Delta, this might be the matchup today. And its result is hard to predict. Islamists would unite around Morsi; liberals and moderates around Sabahi. If the parliamentary results are anything to go by, Morsi wins in a close one. Prediction: Morsi, 55-45.

Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh vs. Amr Moussa: This was a matchup many, including Egyptian state TV in its debate, predicted. The polls showed this two weeks out, and had elections been held then, we would have seen a different story. This is the least exciting matchup, perhaps, but also maybe the one best for the revolution. It offers a liberal, accepting Islamist endorsed by those left and right, and a pragmatic secularist, sorta-kinda felool, sorta-kinda revolutionary. Aboul Fotouh would have dominated with MB and Salafist support. Prediction: Aboul Fotouh, 65-35.

Tomorrow, we'll look at the actual reality: Morsi vs. Shafiq, the Islamists vs. the regime. For a long time, this battle was fought in secret and in the prisons. For the first time, Egyptians must choose sides in public.

Questions on Egypt's Transition

A reader posted the following questions to me on Facebook upon reading my post about picking Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh. I think they're useful for the discussion about this election and its long-term effects.

I have followed the Muslim Brotherhood ever since it was mentioned in the book, Infidel. I have read that the military funneled millions of dollars to them ahead of the Nov. elections. Seems neither of those 2 parties want a full, secular, democratic system. What happened to Khairat el-Shater who was initially nominated by the Brotherhood? He wanted a return to Sharia law. What do you think will be the military's role in the future of Egypt?

My response:

1. Infidel is a fairly biased book. Not my favorite of the many, many books on this region. I'd take a look at The Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, and No god but God, by Reza Aslan.  

2. Never heard anything about that, but there are rumors of collusion between the military and the Brothers. As of right now, though, the Brothers are constantly criticizing the military and that relationship is all but gone. Remember, the military repressed the Islamists quite forcibly for 60 years. 

3. The military definitely doesn't want full democracy, but they're mostly concerned with maintaing a) autonomy b) control of their economic empire c) U.S. military aid. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, does want democracy, and are mainly concerned with a long-term, gradual societal shift to operating on Islamic principles. For instance, the Brothers generally do not favor banning alcohol or mandating the hijab, viewing these as personal choices. The Salafists, who are much more conservative and for a long time hated democracy as it usurped God's authority, would favor banning these things immediately. What we all need to understand here is that there will be no 'secular' democracy in Egypt or in anywhere in the region, and that's not a problem. Turkey functions just fine, and Israel does, sort of. Italy has a state religion and is just fine.  

4. Khairat el-Shater was disqualified because he had been charged with a crime within the past five years, terrorism against the Mubarak regime. He appealed and lost the appeal.  

5. "He wanted a return to Sharia law." This is pretty ambiguous. What does "Sharia law" mean? There are a variety of interpretations and values in the Islamic Sharia. None of them are "bad" per se, but they are different than what we're used to. What's meant by "return"? Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, under Mubarak and today, says that the basis for legislation will come from the principles of the Islamic Sharia. And those principles are very wide. A good guide to this (long read, but well worth it) comes from Nathan Brown of the Cairo Review of Global Affairs (update: actually, the Carnegie Endowment for International Piece, but the Cairo Review republished it). 

6. The military will want to stay in power, at least in their own domain. They will try to exert influence over the president, whoever that may be. They will want control of their economic assets, which are vast and a significant portion of the country's economy. But Egyptian military officers I've met in DC are extremely sympathetic to the revolution and its causes, particularly the younger ones. The old guard is, frankly, dying. But in the immediate future, the military will cede significant authority to the new president, particularly if it isn't Morsi or Sabahi. There will be a huge power struggle until a new constitution is written between the Parliament and the presidency and the army. But the arc of history will tend toward civilian rule, eventually.