The Worst Possible Result, Part 2

After taking a day to compose myself, I've come to a couple conclusions, part of which are mostly in line with Bassem Sabry's optimistic take on the election results. It should be noted, though, that this requires a certain series of events to follow a certain timeline, which I'll detail below. In short, though, this is what we can draw from the results:

1. This is still the worst possible scenario, and in some ways it has only gotten worse since yesterday. I know yesterday I speculated that some people, particularly the Brothers and Salafists, would have found a Moussa-Shafiq matchup even worse. To be sure, that result would have inspired rioting and send tremendous disunity throughout Egypt. But Moussa likely would have won and not entirely marginalized the Islamist groups, particularly the FJP in parliament. This scenario is worse. Disunity? Check. More on that later. Rioting? Almost, and leftists have shown tremendous restraint thus far. But these are the most polarizing candidates, as pointed out by the Arabist. They are the candidates which significant segments of the population trust the least. Morsi and the Brotherhood are mistrusted (if not even deeper feelings) by the entire secular and liberal groups, and by many Salafist leaders. Shafiq is hated by everyone not part of the former NDP, and perhaps Coptic Christians. Choosing between two different nightmares is not optimal for Egyptians, and no candidate still in the race can unite Egypt. What's interesting is that each of the other three had the potential to do so.
2. Ahmed Shafiq cannot win, and must not. We ought to discount Ahmed Shafiq's potential to unify Egypt out of hand. But for a moment, let's consider reasons to vote against Shafiq, if not for the Ikhwan. Shafiq held a press conference today, a comprehensive summary of which can be found via Rawya Rageh. In it, while on the one hand he promised to reach out to all, saying he was open to deals and called for everyone to join hands. Yet when he was accused of being part of the old regime, he snapped, "grow up, move on." He ignored all questions about his role in the Camel Battle and in firing on protesters. Shafiq can never unite Egypt. We need look no farther than his own words and actions.
3. Mohammed Morsi is not the optimal candidate to unite Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is known historically for moderation. Hassan al-Banna initially forbade the Brothers from engaging in politics, then contested elections. Then, the Brothers once again stayed out of politics as they were repressed by Nasser and Mubarak. Those imprisoned, including Essam el-Erian, generally moderated on their way out. The Brothers have turned from the path of Sayyid Qutb and violent overthrow, for which we can all be thankful. But there is still a conservative/moderate divide within the Ikhwan, seen prominently in Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh's departure, the resignation of several members after the nomination of Khairat el-Shater, and the conservative remarks (submitting legislation to a shura council of religious scholars, for instance) made by Morsi. Unlike the big tent campaign of Aboul Fotouh, Morsi can only lay claim to Brotherhood support. Unlike the amazing rise of Hamdeen Sabahi, Morsi and the Brothers were slow to support the revolution. Unlike the outside cautious support of Amr Moussa and his consistent espousal of the revolution's ideals, however sincere, Morsi has little experience in government and alienates Egyptians more than Egyptians tolerate him.
4. There is one possible positive outcome, which can come a couple ways, but has the same ending. Morsi can unite Egypt through really only one way, which is somehow building his campaign into a nationwide coalition against Shafiq. There's reason to trust Morsi on this: Farah Saafan followed his presser Saturday, in which he made many open overtures to Copts and other groups. Certain revolutionaries including Ayman Nour have offered five points of concession to both Shafiq and Morsi. Morsi himself has made personal overtures to Moussa, Aboul Fotouh and Sabahi, each of whom (unwisely, in my opinion) rejected an offer to meet to form a coalition. Still, Egyptians have a month, and few want a return to the Mubarak era.
5. Egyptians are understandably upset over the results, and are choosing discord to defend essential values over unity and compromise. This is understandable. Egyptians were devoted to their respective candidates, particularly the supporters of Hamdeen Sabahi. Nobody, least of all the secular left, wants to ally with the MB. But in the end, they may have to. Boycotting the runoff is not a solution; it will result in the shutting out of important and valuable forces from political power. Including Sabahi, Aboul Fotouh and Moussa as important positions in the potential new government under Morsi, perhaps even one as prime minister, along with ministerial positions for women and Copts, would at least give unity a shot, however unrealistic. Sabahi's supporters were fiery in support of their candidate today, but unless SPEC and SCAF nullify the votes of police officers and military personnel (a rumor, but nonetheless one that might just be true), he won't face Morsi. As hard as it may be, democracy requires choosing the lesser of two evils. Working within the new system is the best way to change it.

As Egyptians move forward with Morsi vs. Shafiq, remembering that the path forward to a united Egypt is on the edge of a knife is not just wise. It's essential.