Questions on Egypt's Transition

A reader posted the following questions to me on Facebook upon reading my post about picking Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh. I think they're useful for the discussion about this election and its long-term effects.

I have followed the Muslim Brotherhood ever since it was mentioned in the book, Infidel. I have read that the military funneled millions of dollars to them ahead of the Nov. elections. Seems neither of those 2 parties want a full, secular, democratic system. What happened to Khairat el-Shater who was initially nominated by the Brotherhood? He wanted a return to Sharia law. What do you think will be the military's role in the future of Egypt?

My response:

1. Infidel is a fairly biased book. Not my favorite of the many, many books on this region. I'd take a look at The Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, and No god but God, by Reza Aslan.  

2. Never heard anything about that, but there are rumors of collusion between the military and the Brothers. As of right now, though, the Brothers are constantly criticizing the military and that relationship is all but gone. Remember, the military repressed the Islamists quite forcibly for 60 years. 

3. The military definitely doesn't want full democracy, but they're mostly concerned with maintaing a) autonomy b) control of their economic empire c) U.S. military aid. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, does want democracy, and are mainly concerned with a long-term, gradual societal shift to operating on Islamic principles. For instance, the Brothers generally do not favor banning alcohol or mandating the hijab, viewing these as personal choices. The Salafists, who are much more conservative and for a long time hated democracy as it usurped God's authority, would favor banning these things immediately. What we all need to understand here is that there will be no 'secular' democracy in Egypt or in anywhere in the region, and that's not a problem. Turkey functions just fine, and Israel does, sort of. Italy has a state religion and is just fine.  

4. Khairat el-Shater was disqualified because he had been charged with a crime within the past five years, terrorism against the Mubarak regime. He appealed and lost the appeal.  

5. "He wanted a return to Sharia law." This is pretty ambiguous. What does "Sharia law" mean? There are a variety of interpretations and values in the Islamic Sharia. None of them are "bad" per se, but they are different than what we're used to. What's meant by "return"? Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, under Mubarak and today, says that the basis for legislation will come from the principles of the Islamic Sharia. And those principles are very wide. A good guide to this (long read, but well worth it) comes from Nathan Brown of the Cairo Review of Global Affairs (update: actually, the Carnegie Endowment for International Piece, but the Cairo Review republished it). 

6. The military will want to stay in power, at least in their own domain. They will try to exert influence over the president, whoever that may be. They will want control of their economic assets, which are vast and a significant portion of the country's economy. But Egyptian military officers I've met in DC are extremely sympathetic to the revolution and its causes, particularly the younger ones. The old guard is, frankly, dying. But in the immediate future, the military will cede significant authority to the new president, particularly if it isn't Morsi or Sabahi. There will be a huge power struggle until a new constitution is written between the Parliament and the presidency and the army. But the arc of history will tend toward civilian rule, eventually.