الرد الی الهجوم الليبية

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 اليوم هو يوم صعب جدا لأشخاص الذين يحوبون الشرق الاوسط والإسلام، مثلي. قتل السفير الامريكي، كريستوفر ستيفنز، مع ثلاثة الأشخاص الأخرين الذين يعملون في السفارة في الهجم الحقير ضد السفارة الامريكية في مدينة بنغازي، مشهورة كما قلب الثورة التي تأتي لاسقاط حكومة معمر قذافي، دكتاتور السابق الليبي السنة الماضية. وأسوأ من ذلك، حدث هذا الهجم علی ذكری سنوية هجوم الحادي عاشر سبتمبر.

وفي الزمان متی اخيراً الامريكان يسعی لتحرك بعد الهجوم، لتواصل مع المسلمين والعرب، يرون أهدافهم الحقيقية لدموقراطية وحقوق الإنسان، هذه كانت الصورة: هجم المتطرفون السفارة، حرقها وقتل السفير الامريكي. قالت قناة CNN علی تويتر ان السفير ومساعدهم مات من استنشاق الدخان. وفي نفس اليوم، هجم المصريون السفارة الامريكية في القاهرة، تسلق الجدار وأزال العلم الامريكي، تبادله مع العلم الاسود مكتوب عليه "لا اله إلا الله ومحمد الرصول الله."

السؤال: لماذا؟ لماذا الآن؟ طبعا، الولايات المتحدة كانت غير سريعة اومستقة في تشجيعها علی الربيع العربي، وطبعا، دعمنا لاسرائيل هو غضب كثير من الناس العرب. لكن لماذا امس؟

الرد في الفليم، اسمه "براءة المسلمين"، صدر جزئيا اليوليو السابق. حقيقةً، سمعت امس اول مرة عن هذا الفليم، وتصورت أن كثير من الامريكيين عندهم نفس الأحاسيس. المخرج، سام باسيلي، من ولاية كاليفورنيا ويعمل في تطور العقار وجمع التبرعات المالية بكمية ٥ مليون دلورات من ١٠٠ شخص يهودي وقال إن سبب الفليم كان هو فضح الإسلام على أنه" سرطان" و"دين الكراهية." ووصف باسيلي نفسه اسرائيلي، ولكن الحكومة الاسرائيلية لم تعرف أي معلومات عنه وكما مواطن. وغني عن القول، باسيلي لم يساعد جهد ضد اللاسمية امس، وتعليقاته فقط تعزيز نقاش الخطأ بنفس القدر من مؤامرة يهودية عالمية. الآن، سام باسيلي يخفي، ولا نعرف الحقيقة عن هويته.

كاهن تاري جونز، مشهور لحرق القرآن الكريم علی ١١\٩، قد تم ربط للفليم. خطط جونز لتقديم الفليم في كنيسته في ولاية فلوردا وما كان عنده دور في جعل الفليم. "براءة المسلمين" تحت النار العلامي في الشرق الاوسط لاسباب واضحة، ولكن خاصةً لدور نبي محمد صلی الله عليه وسلام. في دين الإسلام، تمثيل النبي - او اي نبي، مثل عيسی او ابرهيم او ادم او نوح او داود والاخرين - ممنوع وحرام. ولكن ربما المسلمين سعفهمون تمثيل النبي بشكل قدوس، وربما هم سيشعرون بالغضب بسسب عدم الاحترم لدينهم، شكت انهم سيقتحمون السفارة الامريكية.

لا، هذا الفليم اسوأ، لانه يصور النبي في أنشطة جنسية. لا أريد ان اكتب عن اللينك في هذا المكان؛ فعلا، لا اريد اي شخص ان يشاهد هذا الفليم. في حين إنتاجه يجب ان يحمله تحت قانون امريكي بسبب حرية التعبير، يجب ان نعترف ان مع الكلام يجيء السؤول.

ولكن في نفس الوقت، الحكومة الامريكية ما كانت عندها دور في إنتاج الفليم. السفير ستيفنز ربما لم يعرف عن وجوده. وطبعا، بغض النظر عن يصور الفليم، رد فعل مناسب ليس اقتحام السفارة او قتيل الابرياء الامريكيين.

كشخص ربی في ظل أحداث ١١\٩، شخص الذي يعترف ان اول عدو امريكي في حياتي هو الارحاب غالباً، هذا الهجم فقط يكثف تصميمي لوقف هذا العمل. وهدفي شخصي ايضاً: بقيت كثير من الوقت في دراسة اللغة العربية وفلوسي في دراسة المجستير الذي سيركز علی الاسلام والشرق الاوسط. انا احب هذا المنطقة و هذا الدين، وعندما اری المتطرففين الذين يدنسونه مع عمل فاسد ضد الابرياء، كسر قلبي ليس فقط لأرواح الضحايا، ليس فقط لعائلاته التي يجب ان تعيش بدون الاعضاء الخاصة، ولكن ايضا لملايين مسلمين ابرياء عندهم امان نقي وهو يلوث مع هذا الكره.

رد فعل علی تويتر وفيس بوك من اصحابي في الشرق الاوسط كان سريع وسلطي، في اللغة العربية واللغة الانجليزية. صديقتي رشا كتبت علی الفيس بوك، "المسلمين المتطرفين الليبيين انتم عار لكل المسلمين في كل المكان في العالم. انتم مخجلين ونحن كملسمين تنكروا هذه الهجوم الارهابي ضد المواطنين السلاميين. هذا ليس طريقة صحيحة لدفاع النبي، حقيقةً، هذا احسن طريقة لشوه صورته وصورتنا في العالم. الاسلام هو دين السلام والغفور، ليس دين الارهاب والقتل. من فضلك المتطرفين المسلمين تركوا ديننا لوحده. انتم لا تساعدون مشاركة رسالة السلام التي روح الاسلام..."

العرب علی تويتر شجبوا الهجوم عالمياً. "حامد" كتب "بطريقة الی ميدان الجزائر #ترابلس، #ليبيا لقول "لا" للمتطرفين الذين يحاولون ان يخطفوا ثورتنا...اراكم هناك."

كتب نادر، "انا اشعر بالغضب...لا اعرف ماذا ساقول هذا ليس كيف نتعامل مع الاشخاص الذين يساعدوننا #ليبيا." دافع اللبيون السفارة وعشرة منهم قتل في الهجم.

واكثر منهم حمل جسد السفير الی المستشفی. وكما قال التويتات، احتج الليبيون أنشطة المتطرفين بشكل كبير الآن.

ردود مثل هذا، والاخرين من العرب عالمياً ارسال صلاة الی الامريكيين الذين قتلوا ليلة امس عطاتني الامل. هذا الصحب، استقيظ للاخبار، انا لم استطع ان اصدقها. لكن حتی في هذه اللحظات، يجن ان نتذكر الملايين الذين يكرهون اسوداد دينهم عن طريق الكراهية.

صلاتي وافكاري الی السفير الامريكي ستيفنز، المساعدين في السفارة، القوات الليبية الميتة وعائلتهم. الله يرحمهم.

ترجم من اللغة الانجليزية http://www.nextgenjournal.com/2012/09/responding-to-the-attacks-in-libya/

Travel Update

To any and all readers out there, I apologize for the lack of frequency of posts in this space. I have been with and without my laptop for the better part of two weeks (coffee and laptops do not mix) and recently had to drop it off again at the computer shop due to a persistent wifi issue, which has finally been resolved. I am also in the middle of some travel, having gone to Washington, D.C., Sunday, and am leaving for Amman, Jordan (traveling through Istanbul) in eight hours.

Please, keep looking for more posts here. On my plane flight, I do plan to do some writing in this space, as much as is possible. My on-the-ground insights from Jordan will appear here over the next eight weeks or so. I will have more limited internet connectivity, and a serious general issue of tons and tons of Arabic coursework that will severely limit blogging time. But I should be able to post away fairly frequently. Until then, salaam.

On the Palestinians

I am by no means a "pro-Israel" person. I am, however, a pro-reality person, and the reality is Israel isn't going away. No matter how hard Hamas, Hizballah, Iran, or whatever other threat tries, Israel will not disappear. They could send the region into catastrophic warfare, sure, but so could a lot of other states. Let's all remember a few really important facts. One: Israel has a better-trained army, if not a larger one, than all of its neighbors with the possible exception of Turkey. Two: Israel has nuclear weapons. They may avoid the question, and that's neither here nor there. But they do, and none of their neighbors possess them. Three: Israel has already beaten its neighbors three major times, and several minor times, in wars. Easily. Moreover, Israel has the United States at its back, and if attacked, likely most of the West. Israel isn't going away, and at some point, we all do need to accept that.

Acceptance of that fact then leads a supporter of the Palestinian people's aspiration for statehood — myself — to demand the best possible borders and state for Palestinians. The way I look at it, there are many millions of Palestinians throughout the world. There are Palestinians who carry a passport from another country, who are citizens of France, the UK, the US, Jordan and others. Of the Palestinians worldwide, these probably have it the "best off," though it still isn't idea. Some, like Randa Jarrar, can't visit their homeland due to a Palestinian ID card. I have many friends in Jordan in this predicament, and it is nothing short of unjust; forbidding Palestinians from visiting family and the third-holiest site in Islam, not to mention the site of Christ's crucifixion for Palestinian Christians, is inherently wrong, security concerns be damned.

Another group is the Palestinian refugees, stateless, in Lebanon, Syria (I hope they've all left, but I'm not sure on this point), Jordan and a few in Egypt. No state. No passport. No citizenship. Stripped of nationality, and frankly, dignity.

Another are those in East Jerusalem, denied Israeli citizenship despite its annexation of the city, denied Palestinian citizenship because, well, there is no such thing. I met a peace activist from East Jerusalem and stayed in a guest house run by him when I visited. He has no passport, yet somehow has been to most of the United States. But he is unique, and his is a tragic situation, stripped again of citizenship and statehood.

Palestinians in the West Bank at least have the Palestinian Authority, but that doesn't help much: It isn't a state. Palestinians in Gaza only just now have access out through the Rafah crossing. Palestinians in Israel get to vote for Arab parties consistently outside of Israeli governments and are discriminated against. It's a no-win situation.

All this leads one to conclude that a state is better than no state. Palestinians with a passport are better off than Palestinians without one. Thus, supporters of Palestine should fight for the best state possible. The two-state solution is not dead until people give up. The alternative — long-term apartheid under a one-state solution — is unacceptable, as is the status quo.

I want to touch on the Egypt-Israel peace treaty (and by extension, the Jordan-Israel peace treaty) in another post, as for some bizarre reason, people are uncertain of its future.

Thoughts on Israel's Coalition Government

Taking a break from Egypt for a day, Aaron David Miller's Foreign Policy piece caught my eye earlier today. Miller argues, rightly in my view, that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu isn't the man to lead Israel through its transition period, establish peace with its neighbors, a Palestinian state and somehow find a way out of the Iranian crisis. Miller:

Israel has its own problems, and a leadership crisis, too. It is undergoing a political transition from a generation of founders who -- whatever their imperfections -- fashioned a remarkable country against extraordinarily grim odds. The era of David Ben Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ariel Sharon has given way to a younger generation of leaders who seem to lack the judgment, authenticity, and legitimacy of their predecessors.

That's about right. Ben Gurion had a ton of credibility. Begin, for some reason, had credibility when he became prime minister (he started out as a separatist), and only gained more after the Camp David Accords. Rabin had credibility, and was assassinated. Peres is still beloved. Sharon was the only Israeli politician with the clout to a) form a successful new political party, Kadima and b) unilaterally withdraw from Gaza. Sharon was next in a long line of Likud party members who came to accept the reality of a much-needed peace. He never got there, but there you have it.

Netanyahu is different. He is cold, calculating and risk-averse. He has shown a tremendous distrust in Arab leaders, particularly Abu Mazen (he's somewhat more comfortable with Salem Fayyad). He rejected Oslo outright, but then came to accept it and cede territory to the fledgling Palestinian Authority. He has been hawkish on Iran, but not nearly as much as Ehud Barak, his defense minister.

Some have argued that the new government, a coalition of Kadima under Shaul Mofaz and Likud under Netanyahu, with the religious party Shas and far-rightist Avigdor Lieberman thrown in for good measure, will pursue peace with the Palestinians. They're not entirely wrong. Peace is certainly more likely now than a month ago. But that's like the difference between finding a needle in a haystack and finding fifty needles in a haystack. It's not that much more likely.

The reason? Kadima is playing on Netanyahu's terms. While they balance the coalition more, they have no real authority or ministerial positions, aside from Mofaz. Kadima was on the brink of elections that would have decimated it and only thrown more power to Likud and Yisrael Beitnu. Neither Labor nor Meretz, nor any of the other new parties, would have been able to take advantage of Kadima's fall. Mofaz saved the party, but he didn't really ensure a peace deal.

Now, there have been encouraging signs. Netanyahu and Abbas have exchanged letters. Peter Beinart makes the claim that the Israelis and Palestinians have been negotiating all along and we haven't heard about it. And Netanyahu could use this moment, with a unity government behind him, to push for a long-term peace deal. There's just no reason to believe he, or the coalition government, has any desire to do so.

Instability, Continued Protests in Egypt: The Rise of Ahmed Shafiq

Today, the official election results were released by the Presidential Election Commission (Bassem Sabry swears there's no "Supreme" in front of it, but the hashtag on Twitter is #SPEC). Egypt has been in a semi-controlled state of turmoil since election results first trickled out on Thursday evening. Apparently, this was the final stimulus to send Egypt back to protests.

An update on the news: Presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq's campaign headquarters in Cairo has been set on fire. Protesters have filled Tahrir Square and Alexandria, tearing apart flyers in the campaign offices, and Shafiq's villa has been graffitied. Aboul Fotouh, Sabahi, Khaled Ali and Amr Moussa have disavowed any cooperation with Mohammed Morsi's campaign. Egypt is divided.

This plays right into the hands of Ahmed Shafiq. If Morsi, Aboul Fotouh, Sabahi, Ali and Moussa are united in any respect, it is in their collective desire to never see Shafiq become president. Thus far, even that desire has not led to any sort of unity among themselves or their supporters. Instead, calls range from boycott to a coup to protests.

Sabahi has appeared on television condemning the burning of Shafiq's headquarters and supporting non-violent protest. But Egyptians are inflamed with anger right now at perceptions of an unjust election. Rumors abound of 900,000 police conscripts voting for Ahmed Shafiq and other election irregularities, but as of now, they're just rumors.

All of this plays right into the hands of Ahmed Shafiq. If I didn't know better, I'd say Shafiq staged all of this today. The burning down of the headquarters, protests when Egypt has lost its appetite for continued protest, divisiveness and anger; Shafiq is the "law-and-order" candidate. This is what he promises to control, by whatever means necessary. That prospect is extremely troubling, but if protesters can't be non-violent, Shafiq could actually win in the runoff.

There's still a month before Egyptians go to the polls again. But these early indicators are troubling. Hopefully, the chaos of today causes supporters of rival candidates and campaigns to rethink calls for unity, and Egypt can stop the rise of Ahmed Shafiq.

The Worst Possible Result, Part 2

After taking a day to compose myself, I've come to a couple conclusions, part of which are mostly in line with Bassem Sabry's optimistic take on the election results. It should be noted, though, that this requires a certain series of events to follow a certain timeline, which I'll detail below. In short, though, this is what we can draw from the results:

1. This is still the worst possible scenario, and in some ways it has only gotten worse since yesterday. I know yesterday I speculated that some people, particularly the Brothers and Salafists, would have found a Moussa-Shafiq matchup even worse. To be sure, that result would have inspired rioting and send tremendous disunity throughout Egypt. But Moussa likely would have won and not entirely marginalized the Islamist groups, particularly the FJP in parliament. This scenario is worse. Disunity? Check. More on that later. Rioting? Almost, and leftists have shown tremendous restraint thus far. But these are the most polarizing candidates, as pointed out by the Arabist. They are the candidates which significant segments of the population trust the least. Morsi and the Brotherhood are mistrusted (if not even deeper feelings) by the entire secular and liberal groups, and by many Salafist leaders. Shafiq is hated by everyone not part of the former NDP, and perhaps Coptic Christians. Choosing between two different nightmares is not optimal for Egyptians, and no candidate still in the race can unite Egypt. What's interesting is that each of the other three had the potential to do so.
2. Ahmed Shafiq cannot win, and must not. We ought to discount Ahmed Shafiq's potential to unify Egypt out of hand. But for a moment, let's consider reasons to vote against Shafiq, if not for the Ikhwan. Shafiq held a press conference today, a comprehensive summary of which can be found via Rawya Rageh. In it, while on the one hand he promised to reach out to all, saying he was open to deals and called for everyone to join hands. Yet when he was accused of being part of the old regime, he snapped, "grow up, move on." He ignored all questions about his role in the Camel Battle and in firing on protesters. Shafiq can never unite Egypt. We need look no farther than his own words and actions.
3. Mohammed Morsi is not the optimal candidate to unite Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is known historically for moderation. Hassan al-Banna initially forbade the Brothers from engaging in politics, then contested elections. Then, the Brothers once again stayed out of politics as they were repressed by Nasser and Mubarak. Those imprisoned, including Essam el-Erian, generally moderated on their way out. The Brothers have turned from the path of Sayyid Qutb and violent overthrow, for which we can all be thankful. But there is still a conservative/moderate divide within the Ikhwan, seen prominently in Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh's departure, the resignation of several members after the nomination of Khairat el-Shater, and the conservative remarks (submitting legislation to a shura council of religious scholars, for instance) made by Morsi. Unlike the big tent campaign of Aboul Fotouh, Morsi can only lay claim to Brotherhood support. Unlike the amazing rise of Hamdeen Sabahi, Morsi and the Brothers were slow to support the revolution. Unlike the outside cautious support of Amr Moussa and his consistent espousal of the revolution's ideals, however sincere, Morsi has little experience in government and alienates Egyptians more than Egyptians tolerate him.
4. There is one possible positive outcome, which can come a couple ways, but has the same ending. Morsi can unite Egypt through really only one way, which is somehow building his campaign into a nationwide coalition against Shafiq. There's reason to trust Morsi on this: Farah Saafan followed his presser Saturday, in which he made many open overtures to Copts and other groups. Certain revolutionaries including Ayman Nour have offered five points of concession to both Shafiq and Morsi. Morsi himself has made personal overtures to Moussa, Aboul Fotouh and Sabahi, each of whom (unwisely, in my opinion) rejected an offer to meet to form a coalition. Still, Egyptians have a month, and few want a return to the Mubarak era.
5. Egyptians are understandably upset over the results, and are choosing discord to defend essential values over unity and compromise. This is understandable. Egyptians were devoted to their respective candidates, particularly the supporters of Hamdeen Sabahi. Nobody, least of all the secular left, wants to ally with the MB. But in the end, they may have to. Boycotting the runoff is not a solution; it will result in the shutting out of important and valuable forces from political power. Including Sabahi, Aboul Fotouh and Moussa as important positions in the potential new government under Morsi, perhaps even one as prime minister, along with ministerial positions for women and Copts, would at least give unity a shot, however unrealistic. Sabahi's supporters were fiery in support of their candidate today, but unless SPEC and SCAF nullify the votes of police officers and military personnel (a rumor, but nonetheless one that might just be true), he won't face Morsi. As hard as it may be, democracy requires choosing the lesser of two evils. Working within the new system is the best way to change it.

As Egyptians move forward with Morsi vs. Shafiq, remembering that the path forward to a united Egypt is on the edge of a knife is not just wise. It's essential.

The Worst Possible Result, Part 1

Egypt's first round of presidential elections is over, and the result is, in my opinion, the worst possible matchup of contenders. Tomorrow, I'll get into the results a bit more and what they might mean for Egypt (I'm also waiting on a rumored meeting between Hamdeen Sabahi, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Mohammed Morsi to take place Saturday). For coverage in the interim, visit Al-Ahram Online and Egypt Independent, as well as The Arabist and Bassem Sabry's Twitters.

In the meantime, I want to run through the runoff matchups that didn't happen, and what they would have meant, what choice they would have offered and what Egyptians might have thought. I offer these in no particular order, as my own ranking of "best-to-worst" is skewed in part by my support of Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and in part because I'm not Egyptian.

Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh vs. Hamdeen Sabahi: This extremely unlikely runoff scenario offers an interesting choice. It would have meant, contrary to what actually happened, the Muslim Brotherhood's campaign apparatus was a) unable to keep its youth in line and b) unable to turn out its members in sufficient numbers. Moreover, it would probably have reflected higher turnout from the revolutionary youth (benefitting Sabahi) and better organization from Salafists (benefitting Aboul Fotouh). None of that happened. Sabahi nearly made the real runoff, though, for reasons which are still somewhat inexplicable. Prediction: Aboul Fotouh, 65-35.

Hamdeen Sabahi vs. Ahmed Shafiq: This would never have happened, as the felool candidates (Amr Moussa and Ahmed Shafiq) split the old NDP vote (to some extent). What it would have meant in terms of turnout is somewhat unclear. The Islamists failing to get a single candidate in the top two would represent an astonishing failure on the part of two campaigns and a longstanding power apparatus. It would have reflected deep disgust on the part of the former FJP voters. And it would mean the Egyptian people swung 180 degrees from their FJP and Nour support to elect a horrible anti-revolution candidate and the leftist candidate most identifiable with the revolutionary youth. Prediction: Sabahi, 80-20.

Mohammed Morsi vs. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh: This was the showdown many may have hoped for. The MB would have successfully replicated its support in the parliamentary elections. The Salafists, too, would have held a reasonably disciplined line, and liberals and moderates would have voted in fair-to-middling numbers for Aboul Fotouh. But for some reason, the Salafists ended up supporting Morsi or Sabahi in Alexandria. This result also might have alienated the revolutionary youth. Prediction: Aboul Fotouh, 60-40.

Ahmed Shafiq vs. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh: Another matchup that could have happened, but didn't, because of the strength of the MB's campaign apparatus. This would have offered Egyptians a choice between unity and division, between a return to Mubarak and an inclusive way forward. The MB would have been incensed, of course, but there was no way Shafiq could have ever received their support. Prediction: Aboul Fotouh, 80-20.

Amr Moussa vs. Hamdeen Sabahi: In the case of the revolution versus the sorta-kinda felool, Egypt would have turned its back entirely on the Islamists. Salafist support for Aboul Fotouh would never have materialized, and the MB would simply have stayed home. The revolutionary youth would have been excited by the prospect of Sabahi's victory, and most of Egypt would have calmly settled on Amr Moussa. The question is, would anyone have voted for him? Moussa ran on an "everyone's second choice" strategy, which failed to turn out voters. Prediction: Sabahi, 55-45.

Mohammed Morsi vs. Amr Moussa: So many people had predicted this matchup, along with Aboul Fotouh and Morsi. It would represent the clash of secularism and Islamism, and the disorganization of the Salafist movement. Well, secularism and Islamism clashed, all right. But in a wholly different fashion. Shafiq is a different type of felool  — at least Moussa endorsed and talked about the revolution. In the end, I think Moussa's second choice strategy would have worked here. Prediction: Moussa, 60-40.

Ahmed Shafiq vs. Amr Moussa: Some people would argue this is the real nightmare scenario, where the Islamists not only failed to get a candidate in the second round, but the revolutionary youth failed to get either Khaled Ali or Hamdeen Sabahi in. There would be no candidate of the revolution. There would only be Hosni Mubarak and a blend of Mubarak and the revolution. Islamists would be shut out. But still, this matchup is less polarizing, and the winner would have been clear. Prediction: Moussa, 70-30.

Mohammed Morsi vs. Hamdeen Sabahi: This almost happened, and we know why. Sabahi's campaign surged late, driven by liberals wary of Aboul Fotouh's endorsement by the Salafists and secularists disengaged with the Moussa campaign. Salafist support crumbled entirely in Alexandria, which Sabahi won handedly. If Shafiq had collapsed in Giza and Cairo as much as he did in Alexandria, and done slightly poorer in the Nile Delta, this might be the matchup today. And its result is hard to predict. Islamists would unite around Morsi; liberals and moderates around Sabahi. If the parliamentary results are anything to go by, Morsi wins in a close one. Prediction: Morsi, 55-45.

Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh vs. Amr Moussa: This was a matchup many, including Egyptian state TV in its debate, predicted. The polls showed this two weeks out, and had elections been held then, we would have seen a different story. This is the least exciting matchup, perhaps, but also maybe the one best for the revolution. It offers a liberal, accepting Islamist endorsed by those left and right, and a pragmatic secularist, sorta-kinda felool, sorta-kinda revolutionary. Aboul Fotouh would have dominated with MB and Salafist support. Prediction: Aboul Fotouh, 65-35.

Tomorrow, we'll look at the actual reality: Morsi vs. Shafiq, the Islamists vs. the regime. For a long time, this battle was fought in secret and in the prisons. For the first time, Egyptians must choose sides in public.

Questions on Egypt's Transition

A reader posted the following questions to me on Facebook upon reading my post about picking Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh. I think they're useful for the discussion about this election and its long-term effects.

I have followed the Muslim Brotherhood ever since it was mentioned in the book, Infidel. I have read that the military funneled millions of dollars to them ahead of the Nov. elections. Seems neither of those 2 parties want a full, secular, democratic system. What happened to Khairat el-Shater who was initially nominated by the Brotherhood? He wanted a return to Sharia law. What do you think will be the military's role in the future of Egypt?

My response:

1. Infidel is a fairly biased book. Not my favorite of the many, many books on this region. I'd take a look at The Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, and No god but God, by Reza Aslan.  

2. Never heard anything about that, but there are rumors of collusion between the military and the Brothers. As of right now, though, the Brothers are constantly criticizing the military and that relationship is all but gone. Remember, the military repressed the Islamists quite forcibly for 60 years. 

3. The military definitely doesn't want full democracy, but they're mostly concerned with maintaing a) autonomy b) control of their economic empire c) U.S. military aid. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, does want democracy, and are mainly concerned with a long-term, gradual societal shift to operating on Islamic principles. For instance, the Brothers generally do not favor banning alcohol or mandating the hijab, viewing these as personal choices. The Salafists, who are much more conservative and for a long time hated democracy as it usurped God's authority, would favor banning these things immediately. What we all need to understand here is that there will be no 'secular' democracy in Egypt or in anywhere in the region, and that's not a problem. Turkey functions just fine, and Israel does, sort of. Italy has a state religion and is just fine.  

4. Khairat el-Shater was disqualified because he had been charged with a crime within the past five years, terrorism against the Mubarak regime. He appealed and lost the appeal.  

5. "He wanted a return to Sharia law." This is pretty ambiguous. What does "Sharia law" mean? There are a variety of interpretations and values in the Islamic Sharia. None of them are "bad" per se, but they are different than what we're used to. What's meant by "return"? Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, under Mubarak and today, says that the basis for legislation will come from the principles of the Islamic Sharia. And those principles are very wide. A good guide to this (long read, but well worth it) comes from Nathan Brown of the Cairo Review of Global Affairs (update: actually, the Carnegie Endowment for International Piece, but the Cairo Review republished it). 

6. The military will want to stay in power, at least in their own domain. They will try to exert influence over the president, whoever that may be. They will want control of their economic assets, which are vast and a significant portion of the country's economy. But Egyptian military officers I've met in DC are extremely sympathetic to the revolution and its causes, particularly the younger ones. The old guard is, frankly, dying. But in the immediate future, the military will cede significant authority to the new president, particularly if it isn't Morsi or Sabahi. There will be a huge power struggle until a new constitution is written between the Parliament and the presidency and the army. But the arc of history will tend toward civilian rule, eventually.

My Pick in Egypt's Elections

I've had Al-Jazeera Arabic on all day on my laptop, blaring loudly from the speakers and probably frightening my neighbors. But today is a big day. Today, the Egyptian people finally grasp the freedoms that so many of their brothers and sisters around the world hold. Today, Egypt holds multi-candidate, mostly free and fair elections for the presidency. They represent the next step in moving past the millenia of dictators, kings and pharaohs ruling over the country. And all I can say is: Long live Egypt, تحيا مصر.
But as I sit here, listening to political analysts debating the results of the elections (not due to be released until at the earliest tomorrow night), I am also struck by the tremendous response of Egyptians to the elections. Cameras throughout Egypt report high turnout, except perhaps surprisingly in Suez. The amount of women voting in mixed and women-only polling stations is astounding and amazing for the country. To read tweets from Egyptians saying (paraphrased, I can't find this tweet), "I asked a woman how long she had been waiting in line. She replied, '30 years.'" I am moved. I cannot imagine these circumstances and I only wish I could be there to see it.

I had initially promised coverage of Amr Moussa and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh yesterday, but due to some commitments that tired me out considerably, I could only get up a post about Mohammed Morsi. A little on Moussa and Aboul Fotouh: Moussa is an enigma, as I've said before. Some call him felool, some say he was independent of the old regime. I don't really know, but I do believe his connections to the Mubarak regime and its policies are mostly overblown. He has apparently campaigned strongly in Upper Egypt, and this could prove decisive in the elections.

Moussa is a candidate I struggled with, as I knew he had been a part of the Mubarak regime and I know much of Egypt wants to totally move past it. I agree, and if I were Egyptian, I don't think I could bring myself to vote for Moussa.

If I were Egyptian, and today unlike any other I wish I could be, I would cast my vote for Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh. Why? Many reasons. I am grateful to the blogging of Zeinobia (follow her on Twitter) at Egyptian Chronicles for detailed coverage of the campaigns.

I first read about Aboul Fotouh on Egyptian Chronicles, and was impressed, in part by his unabashed support for religious freedom, even for Bahai in Egypt. Then, I became even more impressed. I am Catholic, and Aboul Fotouh spoke at length at a Jesuit Center in Egypt. This is unheard of. Remember, Aboul Fotouh is a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood. He has openly declared apostasy should not be punishable by death. This, more than anything, was a big deal for me in supporting him.

I am in a somewhat odd position, as I ordinarily would shy away from supporting an Islamist. I do not trust Mohammed Morsi, who comes from an entirely different camp within the Brotherhood. I was extremely pleased when Hazem Abu Ismail was disqualified from the race, as a Salafist candidate with strong popularity would have been a disaster for Egyptian-American relations. Yet I could never support someone like Ahmed Shafiq, or, to a lesser extent, Amr Moussa. That left basically Hamdeen Sabahi...but someone who wants to destroy the cornerstone of remaining stability in the Middle East, the Camp David Accords, is not someone I could support as an American.

Aboul Fotouh is by no means a perfect candidate. I would prefer someone more secular. But his ability to bring together all of Egypt is remarkable. The Arabist's podcast today discussed a young Muslim Brotherhood supporter who was undecided between Aboul Fotouh and Morsi, but gave Aboul Fotouh a fair chance and a listen. The Salafist support for Aboul Fotouh, in contrast to many liberals, actually assures me that he will represent all of Egypt as a president. Salafists are a part of Egyptian society, and observers ought to recognize this, reach out and include them. Groups moderate with political responsibilities. His advisers are male and female, socialist and liberal, an impressive mix.

I am moved by this man's campaign, and I hope he moves into the top two run-off in June. Look for more analysis Thursday on Egypt's election and a discussion of the results on Friday.

تحيا مصر

The Problem with Mohammed Morsi

The conventional wisdom in Egypt is that Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, Amr Moussa and Mohammed Morsi will take first, second and third in some order on Wednesday and Thursday's first round of presidential elections. That's not entirely borne out in polling — Al Masry Al Youm showed strong results, for instance, for Ahmad Shafiq — but each of the candidates has distinct reasons to believe he will advance from the first round of elections.

Morsi in particular faces weak polling results. Al Masry Al Youm and pollster Baseera found Morsi with just 1.5 percent support, though the poll also showed 54 percent of Egyptians undecided. Polling in Egypt is unreliable; polling in the various governates outside of major cities, like Cairo and Alexandria, is difficult and costly. Using cell phones and landlines as Baseera did works well in the United States, but it's unclear how well this succeeds in Egypt. A poll by the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in April showed Morsi with just 0.9 percent support. The Brookings Institution found Morsi with eight percent support as of May 10.

And yet, observers still count Morsi among the front-runners, even while so-called "dark horse" candidates Hamdeen Sabahi and Ahmad Shafiq climb in support. Why?

Well, for starters, Morsi is the Freedom and Justice Party's candidate. The FJP is the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the most potent political forces in Egypt, and certainly the most organized. The only other forces that can lay claim to the level of response the Brothers can offer are, potentially, the revolutionary youth and the Salafists, through their mosque network. But the Brothers are unrivaled in organization, leading to an overwhelming victory in the parliamentary elections. One expects whatever percent of the Egyptian public holding membership in the Brotherhood — 25, 30, 40 percent — a  majority of those will back Morsi.

But there is dissent in the ranks of the Brothers. For months, the Ikhwan claimed they would not field a presidential candidate. Of course, they claimed they would not contest more than a third of the parliamentary seats, either. Neither of those claims were true, which doesn't mean the Brothers were lying — it just means they couldn't resist the lure of power, nor could they trust others with managing the revolution in the way they want it to go. These moves have not only discredited the Ikhwan among the populace — they've caused dissent in their own ranks, and for once, even the Brotherhood couldn't hide it from the outside world. Three Brotherhood leaders resigned after the decision, which was reportedly closely contested. Liberals and other Islamists have publicly criticized the FJP's decision.

Morsi still is running with the full support of the remaining Brotherhood members. The disqualification of the original FJP nominee, Khairat al-Shater, and a popular Salafist preacher, Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail, also may add to Morsi's vote column — he is certainly more conservative than Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, Amr Moussa, Hamdeen Sabahi and Ahmad Shafiq. But the Salafist leaders (though they have much less control over their believers than the Ikhwan) have united behind Aboul Fotouh.

What is certain is that Morsi divides the Islamist vote between Aboul Fotouh and himself, with a small percentage to Mohammed Selim El-Awa of the Al-Wasat Party. But the relative unity of Salafists behind Aboul Fotouh, combined with his popularity among liberals and moderates, unmatched by Morsi, makes Aboul Fotouh much more formidable.

I see Morsi as the weakest of the "top three" contenders and the most likely to drop to fourth, behind either Shafiq or Sabahi. But he could just as easily finish first behind an overwhelming wave of support from the Freedom and Justice Party rank and file. On Wednesday, we will see our first indicator of just how strong the Brothers are in this election.

#EgyElections: A Rundown of the Contenders

Opening our discussion at 3boor al-7odud is the current top story in the Middle East, Egypt's upcoming first round of presidential elections. Set to occur May 23 and 24, the elections pit 13 candidates against each other. The top two will move on to a run-off election, set for June 16 and 17, provided no candidate receives 50 percent plus one of the vote. This is all but a certainty, given the tremendous strength of a number of the candidates.

It should first be noted that Egypt's elections are first and foremost about Egyptian public opinion. While certainly the United States holds a strong interest in the identity and politics of the winner, if there's one thing America should have learned from our disastrous boots-on-the-ground interventionist era, it's that picking and choosing winners in other countries is rarely successful and often builds intense antipathy toward the United States. In a region where already much of the public holds a low opinion of the United States, we certainly don't need any further triggers.

Understanding who's likely to win the elections in May is a tricky business. Public opinion polling is notoriously spotty in Egypt, as are newspaper surveys. The polling houses with the best track records sometimes come from out-of-country, as in the case of the Brookings Institution and the Pew Center. Neither of these institutions, to my knowledge, has done any substantive polling of candidate preference. (Update: Brookings conducted a poll here ending the day of the first presidential debate. Results: Aboul Fotouh 32 percent; Moussa 28 percent; Shafiq 14 percent; Morsi eight percent; Sabahi eight percent). I find it much more instructive to listen to anecdotal accounts given in newspapers and through conversations with Egyptian friends, compare them with the best public opinion survey done to date — the parliamentary election results — and draw conclusions from there.

Here's a rundown of the contenders in Wednesday and Thursday's elections. A good summary of candidate platforms done by the Cairo Review of Global Affairs is available here. First, let's sweep a few candidates out of the way.

• Khaled Ali, lawyer, human rights and labor activist: Though Ali is popular with the youth and the left, particularly after calling for trial of members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), neither of these groups are so strongly in his column or so numerous as to ensure a top-two selection. This being said, unlike other leftist candidates, his platform is less socialist and extremely balanced toward civil rights, promising vice presidencies for at least one woman and one Coptic Christian.
• Abdullah El-Ashal, professor of international law: El-Ashal has no natural base among the electorate. He is notable for openly calling for review of the 1979 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, and has a distinguished career as a diplomat. The smaller Salafist (ultraconservative Muslim) party, Al-Asala, endorsed him. Al-Asala holds three seats in the Egyptian People's Assembly.
• Mohammed Selim El-Awwa, Islamist thinker, member of Al-Wasat: While it is tempting to put El-Awwa, as a moderate Islamist, among the "contenders," the fact remains that his party is much smaller than the two major Islamist parties, Freedom and Justice (the Muslim Brotherhood) and Hizb al-Nour (the Salafists). El-Awwa is an interesting candidate for Christians in Egypt, as he is a co-founder of the Arab Muslim-Christian Dialogue Group, but recently made inflammatory remarks about Copts stockpiling arms in churches and monasteries. Al-Wasat controls 10 seats in the Egyptian People's Assembly.
• Hisham El-Bastawisi, judge: Though supported by the April 6 movement, a youth activist group seeking to continue the revolutionary spirit of January 25, El-Bastawisi has no natural large constituency. He is supported by the Tagammu Party, which holds four seats in the Egyptian People's Assembly.
• Mohammed Fawzi Eissa, lawyer, former police officer: Police officers, once a respected, if not feared, class, are now despised by the Egyptian populace for their role in repressing the revolution. Egyptians yearn for a police force operating under the rule of law and for the people, not a dictator. Perhaps Eissa is that policeman, but his candidacy suffers from a lack of name recognition and no natural base. He is supported by the Al-Geel Al-Democrati Party, which holds no seats in the Egyptian People's Assembly as far as I can tell, but is part of the Muslim Brotherhood's Democratic Alliance.
• Mahmoud Hossam El-Din Galal, former policeman: Galal is another policeman. He worked with the United Nations Middle East Human Rights Department in the late 1990s and has focused his platform on reforming state security. Galal is an independent, and just like in the United States, unless you have superior name recognition, a lot of money and a natural base (we'll get to that soon), winning as an independent is impossible.
• Abul-Ezz El-Hariri, longtime social justice and opposition activist: El-Hariri also has little to no base of support. He shares concerns with many of the leftists in the race, and operates a political platform based primarily on redistribution of wealth. He is the candidate of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, which holds seven seats in the Egyptian People's Assembly.
• Hossam Khairallah, former assistant chairman in Egyptian intelligence: The title says it all for Khairallah; someone who was this closely tied with the Mubarak regime's worst elements (intelligence and police forces) will never be elected president of Egypt post-revolution. He is the candidate of Al-Salam Al-Democrati Party, an offshoot of Mubarak's National Democratic Party, which holds one seat in the Egyptian People's Assembly.

For those of you keeping score at home, I have eliminated from "top-two" consideration eight of the 13 candidates for president. Of the previous eight, the only one who might — and this is a very distant "might" — pose a strong showing (in the top four) is El-Awwa, and then only if the Islamist candidates wholly collapse, something which is unlikely.

The next two candidates are perceived longshots to reach the top-two run-off election in June. However, some polling (spotty, of course) has put them in contention, and anything could happen Wednesday and Thursday. 

• Hamdeen Sabahi, former member of Parliament, poet, co-founder of Kefaya! movement: Sabahi is an interesting candidate. Only a week ago, I would have dismissed him as a protest vote by those who simply don't want to vote for stronger candidates with a secularist background. But Sabahi came in fourth among Egyptians voting abroad this month, and brings a strongly anti-Israel and pro-leftist orientation to the presidential campaign. He has been endorsed by prominent novelist Alaa El-Aswani, openly calls for review if not outright abrogation of the Camp David Accords and is an out-and-proud Arab nationalist in the mold of Gamal Abdel Nasser, leader of Egypt after the 1952 revolution. His party, Karama (Dignity), holds six seats in the Egyptian People's Assembly under the banner of the Muslim Brotherhood's Democratic Alliance, but he is running as an independent. Calling on the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser is risky, because while Nasser's proud nature led to a few successes in Egypt, many Egyptians associate the 1952 revolution with failure against Israel, a sprawling, bloated public sector fueled by a Nasser-era law mandating employment for every Egyptian with a college degree, dictatorship and military rule. Yet I spoke with a friend who decided to vote for Sabahi; she told me he was clearly not associated with the Mubarak regime and had no Islamist leanings, reason enough, perhaps, for many Egyptians' votes.
• Ahmed Shafiq, former prime minister: If Sabahi's standing in the elections is a surprise, Shafiq's is earth-shattering. The last prime minister under Hosni Mubarak — some say his preferred successor — somehow has achieved rising standing in the polls, to the dismay of many Egyptians. If he makes it to the top-two runoff, it is certain the Islamists will unite against him, remembering Mubarak-era repression. But in May's election, Shafiq brings to the table experience with the military (he's a former Air Force general), experience in politics as prime minister and minister of aviation and unqualified support for SCAF. In contrast to every other candidate involved with the Mubarak era, and certainly those who have always been in opposition, Shafiq loudly touts his connection to the past. He rarely mentions the revolution, openly talks of countering the Islamists — again, it's a wonder he even has this much support. But a survey by Cairo's Al Masry Al Youm newspaper put him first among the candidates this week. Anything could happen Wednesday and Thursday, particularly if the military decides it has had enough of democracy and begins stuffing ballot boxes.

We reach the final group of contenders now, two of which I would expect to emerge victorious later this week. Who of these three, or one of the last two? Nobody knows. 

• Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, former member of the Muslim Brotherhood: When I first read about Aboul Fotouh earlier this year, I had thought there was no way he could win. There was a plausible path — if the Muslim Brotherhood stuck to their plan to stay out of the presidential election, if secularists were split — but that path hasn't exactly worked. What has is a tremendous sequence of events falling in Aboul Fotouh's favor: the Muslim Brotherhood reneged on their pledge, fielding Mohammed Morsi; secularists and leftists fractured into the above set of candidates and Amr Moussa; and popular Salafist preacher Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail was disqualified due to his mother's American citizenship. Aboul Fotouh's draw is his big tent philosophy: supporters count themselves as liberals, moderates, secularists, Islamists, Salafists. The Salafist party Hizb al-Nour endorsed him, causing liberals to recoil in concern. But Aboul Fotouh still receives support from liberals like Google executive Wael Ghonim. More than any other candidate, the liberal Islamist can lay claim to a broad cross-section of the Egyptian populace. His guaranteed support for Christians and women reflects the views of many Egyptians, concerned now with unity, not division. He debated Amr Moussa in Egypt's first-ever presidential debate and won overseas voting. Look for him to likely emerge among the top three, if not receive a plurality of support.
• Amr Moussa, former foreign minister, former secretary-general of the League of Arab States: Moussa is an enigma. Some Egyptians call him felool, a derogatory term for the remnants of the Mubarak regime (including my Egyptian friend who voted for Sabahi). Some say his distance from the regime from 2001 on keeps him out of the hated category of "former regime official." Some point to his declaration in 2010 of support for Mubarak in presidential elections as reason enough to vote against him. But nobody can deny Moussa's tremendous expertise. He won considerable goodwill with the populace as foreign minister criticizing Israel, though the Arab League under his leadership advanced peace initiatives to various Israeli governments. He has vociferously campaigned in Upper Egypt, long ignored by the Mubarak regime. His debate performance won praise, including his questions of Aboul Fotouh regarding potential promises made to the Salafists. Yet Moussa is still mistrusted by many. Look for him to emerge among the top three, if not in the top two with his debate partner Aboul Fotouh.
• Mohammed Morsi, president of the Freedom and Justice Party, Muslim Brotherhood leader: Morsi comes with a built-in base of support. Freedom and Justice won nearly half of the seats in the parliamentary elections, and the Muslim Brotherhood's system of organization nearly guarantees him significant support. Morsi is from the conservative wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, opposed to the wing Aboul Fotouh used to belong to. He has supported, in the past, reviewing legislation with a council of religious scholars and making the presidency a male, Muslim-only position. He hails from the traditional Islam howa al-7al branch of the Brotherhood: Islam is the solution. Egyptians worry he will simply be a puppet for the Brothers' Supreme Guide and Shura Council. Yet his platform of neoliberal economics and conservative outlook could prove persuasive to Salafists resistant to Aboul Fotouh's liberalism. While I would cautiously put Morsi third in the polls on Wednesday and Thursday, one should never count out the Brotherhood, the most potent and organized political force in Egypt. It is certainly possible Morsi could emerge in the top-two, or even victorious.

This opening post was much longer than I expected, but that's what you get with 13 candidates to cover. For additional resources, check out the Arabist's rundown and Al-Ahram's "view on the street."

Look for a detailed post on Aboul Fotouh, Moussa and Morsi tomorrow, and my own personal pick (as an American and an Arabist) on Wednesday morning.

Welcome to 3boor al-7odud, Crossing Borders. 

أهلاً وسهلاً ومرحباً بكم في "عبور الحدود."

Introduction

Welcome to 3boor al7odud, or "Crossing Borders." For a few years, I've written occasionally about the conflicts in the Middle East, interfaith dialogue and international relations. In 2010, I published a four-part series on the Arab-Israeli conflict, studying at the time in Amman, Jordan, just a few kilometers from Jerusalem. In June, I will return to Jordan for an intensive Arabic program, followed by two years of study at the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies. Inshallah — if God wills — I will receive degrees in Middle East politics and Islamic studies.

I am, by no means, an expert on the Middle East. Frankly, I would call very few people true experts in the region. We all come with our own unique biases, informed by the environment in which we were raised and in which we studied. I do, however, believe I have something to offer to the intense discussions currently racking policy analysts, and more importantly, Arabs, Israelis, Turks and Iranians. For years, I have studied the Middle East from American and Arab perspectives; soon, I will become acquainted with the tremendous experience — putting it lightly — of the British in the Middle East. This web of information, combined with traditional political science methodology, gives me at least some basis from which to examine the tough challenges facing the region.

Above all, though, I wish to only offer my opinion. If one thing has become clear in the so-called Arab Spring, it is that the future of the region is not for the nukhab — the elites — to determine. The shouts ring through the streets, from Tunis to Manama, from Sana'a to Amman, from Damascus to Cairo: al-sha'ab yurid isqaT al-niTHam, the people want to topple the regime. The best any of us can do, as observers, is to stay out of the way, to support when asked and to add to the multitude of information available for all who love the Middle East.